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AT THE CULMINATION of World War II in 1945, United States
forces entered and defeated the Japanese front.1 Since that time,
American troops have maintained a broad and continuing military
presence in Japan.2 Initially, the United States justified its interference
as a pursuit to "rebuild the internal structure of the defeated state."
3
However, as time progressed and Japan recovered from nuclear de-
struction and reconstructed its shattered economy, American troops
remained.
I. Background
Advocates of the United States-Japan alliance aver that this part-
nership was the paramount outcome of that devastating war. 4 While
visiting Japan's Cornerstone of Peace Park, President Bill Clinton
stated that "[t] he strength of our alliance is one of the great stories of
the 20th century."5 Before the Japan-American Society, 6 the Assistant
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1. See Steven G. Hemmert, Peace-Keeping Mission SOFAs: U.S. Interests in Criminal Juris-
diction, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J. 215, 235-36 (1999).
2. See id.
3. Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
4. See Edwin Chen, Clinton, In Japan for G-8 Summit, Vows to Cut U.S. 'Footprint' on
Okinawa, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 21, 2000, at Al.
5. Id.
6. TheJapan-American Society is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, educational, and cultural
organization of individuals and institutions with an interest in Japan and United States-
Japan relations. It serves as a forum for promoting understanding between Americans and
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Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs stated that the "se-
curity relationship that particularly in light of its origins, is unprece-
dented in history ... the partnership between our two countries, the
two biggest economies in the free world, benefits not only ourselves
but the world as a whole." 7
The rhetoric surrounding the United States-Japan alliance is posi-
tive and promising, but testimony and criminal statistics reflecting the
behavior of United States servicemen stationed in Japan may paint a
different picture. For example, in 1955, a six-year-old child was raped
and murdered by a United States Sergeant.8 In 1974, a "sleeping wo-
man was beaten to death with a cement block by a U.S. serviceman
intending to commit robbery."9 On September 4, 1995, three military
men rented a car, abducted a twelve-year-old schoolgirl and raped
her.10 In 1996, "[flormer U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Richard
Macke was forced to apply for early retirement... after... [he was
quoted saying] that [the] three United States servicemen who . . .
rape[d] a 12-year-old girl in Okinawa, should have hired a prostitute
instead."' "I On January 16, 2000, Lance Corporal Oswald McDonald
was arrested for trying to sexually assault a Japanese woman at a
disco.' 2 In 2002, Lance Corporal Kurt Billie was charged with arson
for allegedly starting two fires in an area outside Chatan 1 3 And, as if
to add insult to injury, Lieutenant General Earl Hailston, commander
of the United States forces in Okinawa, made derogatory remarks
Japanese citizens through its cultural, public affairs, and educational programs. The Soci-
ety's programs reach out to a diverse audience, providing a forum where business, govern-
ment, and community leaders and the general public are able to meet and discuss issues of
concern to both countries in an atmosphere of friendship. SeeJapan-American Society of
Washington, DC, at http://www.us-japan.org/about.html (Sept. 28, 2002) (last visited
Sept. 28, 2002).
7. Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian & Pacific Affairs, Ad-
dress before the Japan-American Society (Sept. 18, 1985), in U.S. Dept. of State, American
Foreign Policy Current Documents 734 (1986).
8. See Adam B. Norman, The Rape Controversy: Is a Revision of the Status of Forces Agree-
ment with Japan Necessariy?, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 717, 722 (1996).
9. Id.
10. See e-mail from Koji Sunagawa, Representative, A Citizens' Group Yearning For A
Peaceful Okinawa, to William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, at http://
www.walrus.com/-dawei/articles/to.president.1995.11.14-e.html (Nov. 18, 1995) (last vis-
ited Oct. 31, 2002).
11. Okinawa Town Demands U.S. Withdrawal, at http://www.cnn.com/ 2001/WORLD/
asiapcf/east/02/15/okinawa.anger/ (Feb. 16, 2001) (last visited Jan. 11, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter Okinawa Town].
12. See U.S. Marine in Okinawa Kept in Detention for Attempted Rape, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Jan. 16, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2713657.
13. See Okinawa 7own, supra note 11.
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about local government officials such as calling the governor and
other local leaders "nuts" and "a bunch of wimps. 1 4 Lieutenant Gen-
eral Hailston's remarks may be indicative of the United States' mili-
tary's attitude toward the local government.15
Such events not only erode the United States-Japan alliance, but
help to underscore the primary source of conflict between the two
nations: criminal jurisdiction. Japanese critics allege that the United
States delays the transfer of custody of United States servicepeople to
Japanese authorities prior to indictment, thus impeding investigation
and favoring the accused United States citizen. 16 They also assert that
this policy fails to deter the abhorrent behavior of American service-
men and women. 17
On February 16, 2001, a local assembly on Okinawa, the site of
America's largest military base in Japan, demanded the "withdrawal of
all U.S. Marines on the island and the resignation of their com-
mander."' 8 As the global community becomes more aware ofJapanese
dissatisfaction, the more likely it is that United States diplomatic en-
deavors will be thwarted and its international reputation tarnished.
The United States has a long history of "sending . .. [troops]
abroad to further [its] national security and foreign policy objectives [,
which] has profound implications under United States and interna-
tional law and raises .. .issue [s] of ... status, rights, privileges, and
immunities. ' 9 This Comment focuses on an instrument essential to
America's military placement scheme: the Status of Forces Agreement
("SOFA").
A SOFA is an agreement entered into between nations that delin-
eates the "legal rights and responsibilities of military forces stationed
on foreign soil."20 At first glance, a SOFA appears to be a minor tech-
nicality among the myriad tasks required to establish an overseas base,
but in actuality it has a much larger role: It establishes the foundation
for diplomatic reciprocity and a "smooth working relationship"21 be-
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. See Norman, supra note 8, at 724.
17. See id. at 718 (stating thatJapanese citizens claim the present United States-Japan
Status of Forces Agreement allows United States servicepeople to commit crimes and avoid
prosecution).
18. Okinawa Town, supra note 11.
19. Colonel Richard J. Erickson, Status of Forces Agreements: A Sharing of Sovereign Prerog-
ative, 37 A.F. L. REv. 137, 137 (1994).
20. Hemmert, supra note 1, at 217.
21. Erickson, supra note 19, at 140.
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tween the sending and receiving nations. 22 In order to maintain politi-
cal legitimacy and positive foreign relations, it is imperative that the
United States considers the profound implications of its military pol-
icy-making. The United States must fashion SOFAs that reach beyond
its own national interests and equitably address the needs and con-
cerns of the receiving nation. By taking this approach, the United
States will do much to garner future international support.
Part I of this Comment describes the evolution of international
jurisdiction and tracks the development of modern SOFAs. Part II ad-
dresses the history of the United States-Japan partnership, the coun-
tries' existing SOFA, and the effects of that SOFA on United States-
Japan relations. Part III exposes the failure of the current United
States-Japan SOFA to create smooth-working relations between the
two nations, and describes the steps Japan and the United States have
recently taken in attempting to address the issue of criminal jurisdic-
tion. Part V presents a solution to this foreign policy failure. It advo-
cates that United States foreign policy shift to a more egalitarian
approach by considering the receiving nation's history and culture, ne-
gotiating for equal bargaining power between the nations, continu-
ously amending SOFAs to comport with current conditions, modifying
current jurisdictional provisions that are unjust and actually enforcing
those provisions, and incorporating principles of morality into its in-
ternational negotiations.
A. Development of Status of Forces Agreements and International
Jurisdiction
The first articulation of international jurisdiction was in Schooner
Exchange v. M'Fadden.23 That seminal case held that a host nation's
sovereignty is absolute; it has jurisdiction over any offense committed
by foreigners within its territorial limits, unless expressly or impliedly
waived. 24 Justice John Marshall's succinct and forthright decision,
however, is misleading. His opinion failed to account for the nuances
of international jurisdiction that existed even at the time of the 1812
decision.
22. See id.
23. 11 U.S. Cranch 116 (1812).
24. See id. at 143.
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1. Evolution of General Rule of Jurisdiction During International
Passage
Justice Marshall qualified his holding by endorsing the concept of
the Law of the Flag, an implied waiver of alljurisdiction by the receiv-
ing country over the sending country's troops, which deemed the
grant of free passage through another's territory.25 Thus, a foreign
general traveling through another country's territory was permitted to
discipline his troops and inflict punishments that the government of
his army required.2 6 This concept relied on the assumption that disci-
pline was an essential military tool, and unless the sending nation had
the ability to punish its own offenders, the Commander would lose
control and his "forces would cease to be an army and would become
a mob." 27
2. Jurisdiction During Occupation
Justice Marshall's jurisdictional ruling was also qualified in times
of war.28 It has been settled international practice that "[w]hile on
duty in occupied enemy countries, or while in combat, .... a service-
man who commits a crime against the laws of the country in which he
is serving is not subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the courts of
that nation."29 Nonetheless, once the occupied country has regained
its sovereignty, this presumed jurisdictional waiver expires and Justice
Marshall's general rule of absolute jurisdiction applies, unless other-
wise stipulated in an international agreement. 30
3. The Brussels Pact
Recognizing such intricacies of international jurisdiction, Justice
Marshall advocated for the creation of international agreements that
would clearly outline jurisdictional practices between sovereigns. 31
The Brussels Pact ("Pact") was one of the first of such accords. 32
25. See id. at 144.
26. See id.
27. Major Steven J. Lepper, A Primer on Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, 37 A.F. L. REv.
169, 171 (1994) (quoting Archibald King, Jurisdiction Over Friendly Armed Forces, 36 Am. J.
INT'L L. 539 (1942)).
28. See Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Criminal Jurisdiction of Courts of Foreign Nations
Over American Armed Forces Stationed Abroad, 17 A.L.R. FED. 725, 743 (2001).
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. See Schooner Exch., II U.S. Cranch 116 (1812).
32. See Norman, supra note 8, at 732.
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Signed in 1948, five European nations that were concerned about
the growing threat of the Soviet Union pledged in the Pact to form an
alliance against the communist regime.33 This Pact was the predeces-
sor to the first international SOFA undertaken by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization ("NATO") ,34 and laid the foundation for one of
the most essential elements of a SOFA: criminal jurisdiction. The Pact
declared that "[m] embers of a foreign force who commit an offense
in the 'receiving State' against the laws in force in that State can be
prosecuted in the courts of that 'receiving state."' 35
The language of the Brussels Pact mirrored Justice Marshall's de-
cision in Schooner Exchange 6 by promulgating host nation jurisdiction.
However, this trend began to shift by the end of World War II. At that
time, the victorious Allied forces acquired immense influence and it
became customary for conquering states to enter a defeated nation
and station troops on a long-term basis in order to "restore" the coun-
try. 37 Due to the inordinate bargaining power that the Allied nations,
and the United States in particular, possessed, and reasoning that re-
ceiving state law would impede the sending state's army,38 the super-
powers were able to insist upon absolute immunity from prosecution
for their overseas troops.39 Because the "weaker" nations needed assis-
tance and believed they needed superpower protection, this unequal
condition was regularly accepted. Basically, "[t]he more a nation
need[ed] the presence of foreign troops, the more likely [it was] to
grant more jurisdiction to the sending state."40
B. NATO: Setting the General Framework for SOFAs
The complete waiver of jurisdiction that the United States and
others negotiated following World War II was short-lived. The NATO
SOFA became the first multilateral treaty under which the sending
state relinquished a portion of its criminal jurisdiction in an interna-
tional agreement.4' The NATO SOFA was created in response to the
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. See Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. Cranch 116.
37. See Hemmert, supra note 1, at 235.
38. See id. at 219.
39. See Norman, supra note 8, at 732. "When both states are not politically or economi-
cally equal, the more powerful state will obtain a broader right of jurisdiction, even in
peacetime." Maj. Manuel E. F. Supervielle, The Legal Status of Foreign Military Personnel in the
United States, 1994 AR-MY LAw. 3, 8 (1994)).
40. Id.
41. See Hemmert, supra note 1, at 220.
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Warsaw Pact and the Cold War, when NATO began to "permanently
station troops in other NATO states. '42 The treaty was designed to
avoid jurisdictional problems and resolve any ancillary issues regard-
ing the signatory countries' rights and obligations that the countries
envisioned would arise from continuous foreign troop presence. 43
When jurisdiction was addressed during the 1953 hearings regarding
the NATO SOFA, the United States State Department declared that
implied immunity from criminal jurisdiction no longer existed under
international law.44 Moreover, in Holmes v. Laird,45 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia extinguished the notion
that a visiting state's troops were immune from the host state's laws. 46
1. NATO Jurisdictional Provisions
Since its creation, the NATO SOFA has become the model juris-
dictional formula.47 Specifically, the NATO SOFA defines two types of
criminal jurisdiction: exclusive and concurrent.48 Generally, a sending
or receiving nation will possess exclusive jurisdiction over an offender
who breaks a law unique to that country. 49 Conversely, both nations
share concurrent jurisdiction if the offender breaks a law applicable to
both countries. 50 Generally, jurisdictional disputes arise where there is
concurrent jurisdiction. In an attempt to eliminate these disputes,
SOFA drafters further categorized concurrent jurisdiction into pri-
mary and secondary concurrent jurisdiction. 51 This distinction essen-
tially determines which nation can prosecute first.52 Under the NATO
SOFA and other SOFAs modeled after it, the receiving state is generally
allocated primary concurrent jurisdiction.53
This grant appears to confer the receiving nation with wide author-
ity to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed within its borders;
42. Id. at 219.
43. See Erickson, supra note 19, at 140.
44. See id. at 139.
45. 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
46. See id. at 1217.
47. See Brigadier General C. Claude, Status of Forces Agreements: An International and
Domestic Obligation to Return Military Personnel from the United States to Foreign Countries for
Criminal Prosecution and Confinement, 26 A.F. L. Rrv. 21, 21-22 (1987).
48. See Kramer, supra note 28, at 731.
49. See id. Because most jurisdictional disputes occur when an issue arises under con-
current jurisdiction, this Comment will not thoroughly address exclusive international
jurisdiction.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See Lepper, supra note 27, at 174.
53. See id.
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however, the rule is almost entirely subsumed by three broad excep-
tions. First, the inter se exception gives the sending state "primary juris-
diction over members of its force or civilian component who commit
offenses solely against its security or property, or against the person or
property of another member of its force or civilian component or de-
pendent."54 Second, the official duty exception provides that the
"sending state has primary jurisdiction over offenses arising out of the
performance of official military duties," which are commonly defined
as "official acts." 55 Within this exception conflicts may arise between
countries regarding the exact definition of an "official act."56 Third,
the waiver exception permits a country to "waive its primary jurisdic-
tion if it considers the other state's prosecution motives to be more
important."57 This exception, which adds flexibility to the SOFA
formula, is premised on the idea that mechanical application of the
SOFA formula cannot adequately account for each party's interests. 58
The United States, however, does not generally waive its primary
jurisdiction in these situations because it is already agitated by its
forced jurisdictional relinquishment in other situations.59 Instead, the
United States often attempts to extend jurisdiction by "construing the
circumstances of a crime so that the offense lies within the U.S. mili-
tary's primary concurrent jurisdiction. '60 In fact, despite SOFA provi-
sions which mandate nations "with secondary concurrent jurisdiction
[to] request [jurisdictional] waivers only in cases of particular impor-
tance,"61 the United States "automatically request[s] a waiver for U.S.
personnel implicated in criminal activity." 62 Underlying this practice
is Army Regulation 27-50, which calls for the United States to maxi-
mize jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the applicable SOFA
agreement. 63
54. Id.
55. Id. at 175.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 176.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Cathleen Caron, Whose Security Is It? Military Violence Against Women During Peace-
time, 6 HUM. RTS. BRIEF. 13, 14 (1999).
61. Id. at 13.
62. Id. The United States Department of Defense report, Statistics on the Exercise of
Criminal Jurisdiction by Foreign Tribunals Over United States Personnel, December 1996-30 No-
vember 1997, states that host countries granted 86.1 percent of United States military re-
quests for waiver of primary foreign jurisdiction in 1997.
63. See generally ARMY REGULATION 27-50, available at http://neds.nebt.daps.mil/Direc-
tives/5820_4g.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2002). This regulation applies to all active and
reserve components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. See id. at i.
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2. Custody Issues
Custody of the accused is a subsidiary point of contention that
frequently arises in jurisdictional disputes. The NATO SOFA and
others modeled after it generally seek to protect American servicepe-
ople who are charged with crimes that occurred in a foreign country
by securing custody.64 Specifically, the "United States may take and
retain physical custody of an accused serviceman until final resolution
of the criminal case by the host nation."65 Had this provision not been
stipulated in the NATO SOFA, international law would call for, the
contrary, and grant the receiving nation the right to take immediate
custody and prosecute under its laws.66 Thus, by negotiating contrary
to customary law, the host nation's prosecutorial rights are further ab-
rogated under the NATO SOFA.
3. SOFAs Drafted As Treaties or Executive Agreements
Another controversial issue arising within a SOFA negotiation is
whether it is drafted as a treaty or as an executive agreement. The
NATO SOFA was drafted as a treaty. Though many SOFAs mirror this
agreement substantively, most of them are drafted as executive agree-
ments rather than as treaties. But many countries are dissatisfied with
executive agreements because they believe the United States bestows
greater authority upon treaties in comparison to executive agree-
ments. 67 Specifically, other countries prefer treaties because they have
an "aura of greater solemnity than executive agreements."68
Some argue that treaties do warrant greater authority because the
United States Constitution specifically confers the right to enter into
treaties to the President,69 and because a treaty is considered the su-
preme law of the land. 70 Congress also prefers treaties because they
require two-thirds approval of the Senate, which gives Congress sub-
stantial power over the agreements. 71 Further, executive agreements
64. See id. at 1.
65. Teagarden, supra note 47, at 23.
66. See id. at 24.
67. See Richard J. Erickson, The Making of Executive Agreements by the United States Depart-
ment of Defense: An Agenda for Progress, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 45, 58 (1995) [hereinafter Agenda
for Progress].
68. Id.
69. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
70. See Teagarden, supra note 47, at 27.
71. See U.S. CONST. at. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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are not expressly approved of in the Constitution and are self-execut-
ing, thus they do not require congressional approval. 72
However, others argue that by and large, foreign assumptions re-
garding executive agreements are without merit. In Dames & Moore v.
Regan,73 the Supreme Court held that executive agreements, initiated
by the President without congressional approval, are valid exercises of
executive power under the Constitution.74 Congress is frustrated by
this trend, because it has less influence over executive agreements. 75
In addition, foreign nations often try to negotiate their SOFAs as
treaties. 76
Regardless of the fact that international law construes treaties
and executive agreements as equally binding,77 and despite Regan's
explicit holding, foreign nations and the United States Congress con-
tinue to prefer treaties, and award them greater weight.78 Notwith-
standing foreign and congressional preferences, since World War II
the United States has drastically declined its treaty practice and more
often enters into a SOFA as an executive agreement.79
C. The Current Situation
The structure and requirements of the NATO SOFA currently re-
main the world standard for SOFAs.80 Nevertheless, there is one dis-
tinct feature about the NATO SOFA: it is a reciprocal agreement.81
This essentially means that the SOFA's jurisdictional conventions are
applied equally regardless of the party's status as a sending or receiving
state. Currently, few non-NATO nations are parties to reciprocal SO-
FAS with the United States.8 2 Instead, they are parties to nonreciprocal
SOFAs that unilaterally apply the jurisdictional rules to disputes aris-
ing from the United States' presence on the foreign nation's soil.83
For example, if a non-NATO nation had troops stationed in the
United States, it would be bound by a different set of jurisdictional
72. See Agenda For Progress, supra note 67, at 48.
73. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
74. See id. at 686.
75. See Agenda for Progress, supra note 67, at 68.
76. See id. at 70.
77. See id. at 58.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 47.
80. See Erickson, supra note 19, at 141.
81. See Hemmert, supra note 1, at 226.
82. See id.
83. See Norman, supra note 8, at 733.
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rules and it would be prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over its
own troops while within United States territory.84
Historically, the United States has justified this imbalance of
power by claiming that:
Foreign nations needed the presence of American troops in their
countries much more than the United States needed the presence
of foreign military personnel in America .. . [, and t] he United
States . .. have often carried a disproportionately high cost of
maintaining the defense against the Communists and other threats
in foreign nations.85
The United States also maintains that other countries do not
need SOFA protection because American Constitutional due process
protections adequately safeguard them.8 6 One may note that these as-
sertions rely on the biased premise that the United States has a more
just legal system than other countries.
II. Japanese Status of Forces Agreement
The United States-Japan SOFA is one example of the comprehen-
sive nonreciprocal agreements into which the United States typically
enters.87 An executive agreement that came into force on June 23,
1960, this SOFA supports the "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Se-
curity Between the United States and Japan."88
A. Historical Development Leading to the United States-Japan
Partnership
The relationship between Japan and the United States dates back
to 1853, when Commodore Matthew C. Perry and his crew entered
the Edo (Tokyo) harbor and "opened" Japan. 89 Perry arrived with a
note from President Millard Fillmore urging Japan to end its "centu-
ries of virtual isolation and . . . [begin] . . .commercial, diplomatic,
and.., other kinds of associations with Americans, other Asians, and
the peoples and nations of the world."90
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 734.
87. See id. at 733.
88. Major William K. Lietzau, Using the Status of Forces Agreement to Incarcerate United
States Service Members on Behalf of Japan, 1996 ARMY LAw. 3, 4 (1996).
89. See GERALD L. HOUSEMAN, AMERICA AND THE PACIFIC RIM: COMING TO TERMS WITH
NEw REALITIES 65 (1995).Japan was "opened" one year later, in 1854, when Perry returned
with more ships and heavy guns. See id.
90. Id.; see also Norman, supra note 8, at 718-19.
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'Japan did not necessarily give voluntary assent to this 'opening
up," 9 1 but nevertheless signed a treaty of peace and friendship with
the United States the following year.92 Unfortunately, soon after the
signing of that treaty, political turmoil erupted in Japan and the Toku-
gawa bakufu regime was overthrown by the Meiji government.93 This
new military administration, desiring to achieve world power status,
undertook an expansionist policy.9 4 Japan's pursuit of supremacy
eventually precipitated United States participation in World War II,
and it was not until the Allies' victory over Japanese forces on Septem-
ber'2, 1945, that Japan was halted and forced to surrender.95 The Al-
lied powers, with the United States in command, began a period of
occupation immediately following Japan's defeat.96 They had two
main objectives: demilitarization and democratization.9 7 As a result of
the Allies' objectives, Japan revised its Constitution to emphasize paci-
fism, 98 and refocused its energies toward economic and civilian sec-
tors.99 Despite the fact that Article IX of the amended Japanese
Constitution prohibits the "development of military forces beyond the
level of [its] internal security needs,"100 Japan was still able to secure
international protection by making use of American troops and their
continuing presence. 101
B. Provisions of the United States-Japan SOFA
As time passed, relations between Japan and the United States
improved, and in 1960 the two countries signed the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security. 102 "Although termed 'mutual,' [this treaty]
did not require Japan to defend American territory; rather, it pro-
vided that American troops were to be based in Japan until Japan
could 'assume responsibility for its own defense."'1 03 Specifically, the
91. HOUSEMAN, supra note 89, at 65.
92. See Norman, supra note 8, at 719.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 720.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See HOUSEMAN, supra note 89, at 79.
100. Id.
101. See generally id. The reshift in focus allowed Japan to concentrate on its economy
and fulfillment of civilian needs.
102. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Jan. 19, 1960, U.S.-Japan, 11 U.S.T.
1652.
103. FREDERICK H. HARTMANN & ROBERT L. WENDZEL, AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN A
CHANGING WORLD 418 (1994).
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treaty codified both nations' legal rights and the responsibilities of
military forces that became the countries' current SOFA.10 4
Article XVII of this treaty provides-the groundwork for criminal
jurisdiction between the two countries. 10 5 The agreement provides
that Japanese and United States military authorities "shall assist each
other in the arrest of members of the United States armed forces, the
civilian component, or their dependents.. .and in handing them over
to the authority which is to exercise jurisdiction."10 6 It also provides
that Japanese authorities shall promptly notify United States military
authorities of any arrest of one of its servicepeople. 10 7 Further, Japa-
nese and United States military authorities "shall assist each other in
the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offenses, and in
the collection and production of evidence," 08 and the authorities
"shall notify each other of the disposition of all cases in which there
are concurrent rights to exercise jurisdiction.' 10 9
Though the provisions of the United States-Japan SOFA appear
to establish an equitable balance of power, a closer analysis reveals an
inequity favoring the United States. The largest point of contention
involves the criminal jurisdiction provision (Section 5(c)) of the cur-
rent SOFA. That provision reads: "[t]he custody of an accused mem-
ber of the United States armed forces or the civilian component over
whom Japan is to exercise jurisdiction shall, if he [or she] is in the
hands of the United States, remains with the United States until he
[or she] is charged byJapan."110 Critics believe this provision enables
United States military authorities to delay and thwart Japanese investi-
gative and prosecutorial efforts."'
Further, critics argue that United States efforts to frustrate prose-
cution -and usurp jurisdiction have actually resulted in an increase in
the number and severity of crimes committed by American troops in
Japan."12 In essence, when the United States attains jurisdiction over a
case, the Uniform Code of Military Justice serves as the working judi-
104. See Gwyn Kirk & Carolyn Francis, Redefining Security: Women Challenge U.S. Military
Policy and Practice in East Asia, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 250 (2000).
105. See id. at 27.
106. Id. at 29-30.
107. See id. at 30.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 30-31.
110. Id. at 30.
111. See Atsushi, Reactions to Rape in Okinawa, UIUC (Nov. 4, 1995), available at http://
deil.lang.uiuc.edu/exchangel/contributions/news/rape3.html. (last visited Sept. 29,
2002).
112. See Caron, supra note 60, at 13-15.
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cial authority. Defendants found guilty by this legal body generally
only receive non-judicial punishments or court martials. 113 Critics of
the current military scheme assert that nonjudicial punishments and
court martials are unpredictable, citing three main reasons that they
fail to guarantee disciplinary outcomes:
First, the status of U.S. military proceedings and the records of ac-
cused servicemen are not readily available, making transparency an
additional hurdle that victims must overcome to raise a successful
claim .... Second, the commanding officer ... has complete dis-
cretion when deciding to pursue either a non-judicial punishment
or a court-martial when a serviceman under his command is ac-
cused of a crime .... Third, U.S. servicemen facing a court-martial
for certain crimes committed, including crimes of sexual violence,
can request a discharge from the military in lieu of facing the
stigma of a conviction. If U.S. military authorities accept the re-
quest, the serviceman walks free.1 1 4
It is not uncommon for court martial convictions in foreign coun-
tries to result in more lenient sentences than criminal trials in the
United States.1 15 As a result, "some activists believe that military vio-
lence against women is seriously under-reported due to victims'
shame, fear, or belief that perpetrators will not be apprehended or
punished."116 The harsh reality is that United States SOFAS and cur-
rent United States military practice protects Unites States troops at the
expense of the local people.' 17
Another controversial debate has arisen over the non-reciprocal
status of the United States-Japan SOFA. A nonreciprocal SOFA is a
113. See id. at 15.
114. Id. at 15-16.
115. See id. at 16.
116. Kirk & Francis, supra note 104, at 247. Military presence in host countries presents
a myriad of negative social effects such as "military prostitution, the abuse of local women,
and the dire situation of mixed-race children fathered by U.S. military men." Id. at 229.
Since the United States occupation of various countries in Asia beginning in 1898, it is
estimated that United States servicemen have fathered 30,000 to 50,000 Amerasian chil-
dren. See id. at 259. See also Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53
(2001). The United States Supreme Court in Nguyen recently compounded the negative
effect of abandoning children abroad, by holding that federal immigration statute section
1409(a), which creates unequal barriers to attaining United States citizenship for children
born to unmarried citizen-fathers and non-citizen mothers, does not violate equal protec-
tion. The court explicitly stated its concern for "young people, men for the most part, who
are on duty with the Armed Forces in foreign countries." Id. at 65. Nguyen, in essence,
failed to create a disincentive for reckless military behavior abroad, by exempting military
men from having to establish paternity for their foreign-born child. This is one more exam-
ple where United States military men are not held accountable for their actions (i.e., fa-
thering and abandoning Asian children), and the local people, children in particular, are
harmed as a result.
117. See Kirk & Francis, supra note 104, at 256.
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unilateral agreement that binds the two nations only while on the host
nation's territory.118 At this time, NATO is the only reciprocal SOFA
to which the United States is a party.' 19 Many nations argue that by
insisting on non-reciprocal SOFAs, the United States is not "playing
fair" and that the United States perceives its government as superior
to that of other nations.' 20
Specifically, there is a general perception that because NATO is
the United States' only reciprocal SOFA, the United States is biased
towards Europeans and prejudiced against nonwhites.' 2 ' Critics con-
tend that "the rhetoric of 'alliance' and 'friendship' . . . hides the fact
that citizens of East Asian countries are not protected by SOFAs to the
same degree as the Western European countries of the NATO alli-
ance."' 22 Overall, East Asian countries operate with lesser bargaining
power because they "see their national security as intertwined with
that of the United States, partly because they continue to depend on
the United States militarily, politically or economically."' 123 The actual
inequities in the East Asian SOFAs are revealed by comparing the
lengths of Western countries' SOFAs to their East Asian counter-
parts. 124 For example, the German SOFA contains eighty-three negoti-
ated articles, while the Japanese SOFA only contains twenty-eight. 125
The criminal jurisdiction provision and the nonreciprocal nature
of the United States-Japan SOFA have been highly criticized by some
Japanese people. Critics are appalled by the criminal offenses that ac-
company American occupation and continue at alarming levels to this
date. 126 For instance, since the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972,
"4,716 serious crimes involving U.S. personnel, their dependents or
civilian employees" have been committed and "[a] ttorneys in Okinawa
estimate that U.S. military personnel commit about 1,000 crimes and
misdemeanors annually in Okinawa."' 27 "A local human rights group,
Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence, cite Okinawan po-
lice records that report U.S. military personnel raped 200 Okinawan
118. See Norman, supra note 8, at 733.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 734.
121. See id.
122. Kirk & Francis, supra note 104, at 251.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 252.
126. See Norman, supra note 8, at 723.
127. Joseph Gerson, I Refuse, in 52 BULL. OF THE ATOM. Sci. 4, 26 (1996), available at
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/l006/ja96/ja96toc.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2002).
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women between 1972 and 1997."128 At this point, critics believe the
current SOFA enables these offenses because it is fundamentally un-
fair, biased, and accords American criminal offenders special
treatment. 129
C. Current United States-Japanese Relations
The unjustified and heinous crimes that continue to occur on
Japanese soil have threatened the United States-Japan partnership.
The Japanese government has repeatedly requested that its current
SOFA be amended, claiming that criminals are neither being brought
to justice nor deterred. 30 As a result, the country continues to fall
victim to the abuses of American servicemen. Because 'Japan is the
single most important player in the Asian balance of power,"'" it is
essential that the United States mend and nurture this relationship in
order to maintain positive working relations with that region of the
world.
III. Problem
The primary goal of a SOFA is to establish and foster smooth
working relations between member countries. 32 However, the cur-
rent United States-Japan SOFA has failed to accomplish this objective.
Specifically, the agreement's criminal jurisdiction provisions, which
guard United States servicemen during pre-indictment proceedings
and impede investigation, have enraged the Japanese public.133 After
a twelve-year-old school girl was raped by three American servicemen
in 1995, 85,000 Okinawan citizens staged the largest protest in history
against a United States military base.' 34 The Okinawan government
took out a large ad in the New York Times begging Americans to help
them "reduce and realign U.S. bases located on their island."' 35 A citi-
zens' group personally emailed then-President Clinton, expressing
their pain and requesting apologies and SOFA revisions. 1 6 In a 1996
128. Caron, supra note 60, at 17. Japanese Human Rights Group "Okinawan Women
Act Against Military Violence" notes that this statistic is likely inaccurate due to the docu-
mented trend of underreporting. See id.
129. See Atsushi, supra note 111.
130. See Norman, supra note 8, at 717-18.
131. HARTMANN & WENDZEL, supra note 100, at 415.
132. See Erickson, supra note 19, at 140.
133. See Norman, supra note 8, at 717-18.
134. See id. at 723.
135. Id.
136. See Sunagawa, supra note 10.
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local referendum, ninety percent of Okinawan voters called for the
immediate reduction of United States bases and further SOFA
revisions. 137
The problem is that "it has been a long-standing United States
policy to seek broad relief from local jurisdiction through the mecha-
nism of a SOFA."1 38 The United States-Japan SOFA is a prime exam-
ple of this approach. The United States has an obligation to protect
the rights of its servicemen abroad; however, the United States must
take other considerations into account when conducting foreign pol-
icy and entering into SOFAs.
A. The Need to Adapt SOFA Agreements to the Changing World
One major flaw in America's inflexible negotiation process re-
garding SOFAs is its failure to adapt existing agreements to current
situations. The international system is characteristically restless; the
dynamic of shifting powers among nations is complex and continually
calls for adjustment. For an international agreement to withstand soci-
etal and cultural shifts, it must be consistently updated to comply with
the emerging needs and concerns of each party to the agreement.
Without the ability to change, an agreement is essentially stripped of
its means of preservation. At present, the United States gives little
credence to the idea of fluid, ever-changing foreign policy. Unfortu-
nately, failure to modify current international agreements to mirror
global shifts may decrease their effectiveness.
B. Offending the Host Nation's Sovereign Dignity
The United States-Japan SOFA, as it is currently drafted, and
American military presence in Japan, is an affront to many Japanese
citizens. United States forces stationed in Japan have been analogized
to a "vestige of colonialism," and are a constant reminder of Japan's
painful past.139 This problem is especially acute in Okinawa, which
remained under United States administration until 1972, though most
of Japan returned to civilian self-rule a few years after World War 11.140
Today, seventy-five percent of land occupied by the United States' is
137. See Toni M. Bugni, The Continued Invasion: Assessing the United States Military Presence
on Okinawa Through 1996, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 85, 92 (1997).
138. Erickson, supra note 19, at 140.
139. Rafael A. Porrata-Doria, Jr., The Philippine Bases and Status of Forces Agreement: Les-
sons for the Future, 137 MI. L. REv. 67, 68 (1992).
140. See Chen, supra note 4, at All.
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on Okinawa, where 26,000 American troops are stationed. 14a The exis-
tence of bases in Japan implies that it is "unable to carry out the criti-
cal duty of a 'sovereign' and 'independent' nation to provide for its
own national defense."' 142
To some, the jurisdictional regulations of the United States-Japan
SOFA are an insult to Japan's citizenry. 143 Many are angered that vio-
lent crimes continue at alarming rates and claim that current provi-
sions do not bring American military offenders to justice. 144 Each
crime that occurs and each protest that is ignored communicates
America's general lack of concern for these matters, and for Japan's
populace as a whole.
C. Constitutional Law Implications
The United States citizens that are sympathetic to the Japanese
plight refuse to support the push for alterations of America's current
SOFA negotiation scheme because they feel it enables the United
States to better safeguard military servicepeople's constitutional
rights. Specifically, they believe the Japanese criminal justice system
denies American citizens their constitutionally mandated right to due
process under the law.
1. Differences Between the Japanese and American Criminal
Justice Systems
The United States is fearful of subjecting its citizens to the Japa-
nese criminal justice system because Japan utilizes a "crime-control"
model, as opposed to the American "due process" model. 145 The main
goal of the Japanese system is to repress criminal conduct,146 whereas
the United States focuses on protecting the individual liberty of the
accused.
Japan grants legal authorities wide discretion to investigate and to
"persuade" the accused to comply with their efforts. 147 They employ
these procedures because they regard confessions as the "best evi-
141. See id.
142. Porrata-Doria, Jr., supra note 136, at 88.
143. See generally Norman, supra note 8 (noting the context in which the SOFA was
created, the jurisdictional provisions as written, the distrust of the Japanese criminal justice
system, and the nonreciprocal nature of the agreement communicates United States' bias
and unfairness).
144. See Atsushi, supra note 111; see also Norman, supra note 8 at 724.
145. See Norman, supra note 8, at 730.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 726.
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dence of the truth.' 48 Additionally, Japan does not provide legal
counsel during the investigation process and views the primary role of
penalties as rehabilitation rather than punishment.1 49
The United States, however, employs a heightened burden of
proof in the criminal context, requiring proof of guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt to ensure due process under the law.' 50 Rules regard-
ing the burdens of persuasion in America were "developed to
safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting
forfeitures of life, liberty and property.' 1 51 The creation of the Bill of
Rights exemplifies an underlying distrust of government in the United
States.152 Accordingly, to protect the accused from faulty conviction,
the founders created certain fundamental rights such as the right to
due process under the law, to confront one's opponent, to compul-
sory process, to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, and
to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. 53
Despite distinct variations between the Japanese and American
criminal justice systems, the Japanese system can hardly be deemed
inferior. In fact, Japan has one of the lowest crime rates in the
world.1 54 Further, only five percent of those convicted are actually sen-
tenced to prison and the average sentence is less than two years. 155
Though the United States protects defendants' rights at the outset of
criminal proceedings, a conviction may result in a loss of freedom that
can last a lifetime.
2. United States Constitutional Rights Are Not Absolute
The American criminal justice system achieves laudable objec-
tives; however, our constitutional laws are not absolute and do not nec-
essarily warrant international application. The Supreme Court in
Holmes v. Laird held:
[American] citizenship does not give . . . immunity to commit
crime in other countries, nor entitle him [or her] to demand, of
right, a trial in any other mode than that allowed to its own people
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See In re Winship v. United States, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
151. Id.
152. See generally John Leubsdorf, Deconstructing the Constitution, 40 STAN. L. REv. 181
(1987) (noting that the Constitution contains a myriad of complex and ambivalent
messages, thus requiring various portions of the text to conflict with the others in order to
compensate for the inconsistencies).
153. See U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI, and VIII.
154. See Norman, supra note 8, at 729.
155. See id.
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by the country whose laws he has violated and from whose justice
he has fled. 15 6
The mere fact that a foreign court does not have the same proce-
dural safeguards as our system should not permit the United States to
interfere with another nation's criminal processes. 157 Further, as one
commentator noted, the trial of a serviceperson in "courts of nations
having different systems of jurisprudence . . .has been held not to
violate any of . . . [his or her] rights under the United States
Constitution." 58
Concerns regarding trial fairness are valid; however, SOFA agree-
ments patterned after NATO are specifically drafted to guarantee that
basic due process requirements are met. 159 For example, Article XVII,
section 9, of the United States-Japan SOFA states,
Whenever a member of the United States armed forces, the civilian
component or a dependent is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of
Japan he shall be entitled:
to a prompt and speedy trial;
to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge or
charges made against him;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, if
they are within the jurisdiction of Japan;
to have legal representation of his own choice for his defense or to
have free or assisted legal representation under the conditions pre-
vailing for the time being in Japan;
if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent
interpreter; and
to communicate with a representative of the Government of the
United States and to have such a representative present at his
trial. 160
These safeguards substantially mitigate the potential unfairness of
an American serviceperson being tried in ajapanese court. Americans
traveling and working overseas are accorded some but not all of the
safeguards of the American system.1 6 1 In actuality, "[r]ecognition of
the host nation's right to exercise criminal jurisdiction is consistent
with the laws of the United States, both domestic and
international."' 62
156. 459 F.2d 1211, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
157. See Teagarden, supra note 47, at 28.
158. Kramer, supra note 28, at 7 (emphasis added).
159. See id,
160. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, supra note 102, at 1666.
161. See Teagarden, supra note 47, at 28.
162. Id. at 33.
[Vol. 37
When unlawful offenses occur in an international context, the
rights of the individual should not be the sole factor in the criminal
justice equation. Foreign policy requires that the situation be analyzed
on a broader scale. Wilson v. Girard163 laid out a balancing test typically
employed by United States courts in these situations. This test involves
weighing the national interest justifying the stationing of troops
abroad against the possibility of any deprivation of constitutionally
protected rights at the hands of foreign local law.' 64 Generally, na-
tional interests will trump individual rights.
In sum, constitutional implications raised by waiving United
States criminal jurisdiction under SOFA agreements are strong. Nev-
ertheless, drafters of these agreements have taken these concerns into
account and have adequately preserved minimum due process protec-
tions within the agreement. Therefore, these concerns should not
serve as a roadblock to other much needed modifications to the
United States' SOFA negotiation process.
D. Steps Taken by the United States to Improve the Situation in
Japan
At present, the United States has taken only three steps to im-
prove relations with Japan. The first was to jointly create a Special Ac-
tion Committee on Okinawa ("SACO"), to reduce the excessive
burden of United States' military bases on Okinawa. 165 Specifically,
SACO was established to develop recommendations "on ways to con-
solidate, realign and reduce [United States] facilities and areas, and
adjust operational procedures of [United States] forces in Oki-
nawa.' '1 66 The second step was to agree to give "sympathetic consideration
to requests [for early custody of the accused] concerning rape and
murder cases."1 67 The final step was for the United States to investi-
163. 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
164. See generally Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957) (where an American solider,
while guarding a machine gun and clothing, fatally wounded a Japanese woman who was
gathering expended machine gun cartridges). Although the security treaty between the
United States andJapan grants the United States primary jurisdiction over members of the
military in relation to offenses arising out of any act done in the performance of an official
duty, the treaty also provides that the United States' authorities shall give sympathetic con-
sideration to a Japanese request for waiver of jurisdiction. See id. at 547.
165. See Bugni, supra note 137, at 107.
166. Id. (quoting SPECIAL ACTION COMMITTEE ON OKINAWA, INTERIM REPORT (Apr. 15,
1996), at http://www.okinawa.ttc.co.jp/chijicomment-e.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2002).
167. Norman, supra note 8, at 724 (emphasis added).
Fall 2002] SOFA
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
gate the feasibility of establishing floating bases in the Pacific
Ocean.168
These steps have merely been band-aids on the suffering relation-
ship between Japan and the United States relationship. This Com-
ment asserts that the United States-Japan SOFA, as originally drafted,
is unfair. If the United States desires to build and maintain longstand-
ing, positive international relations, it needs to revise and update the
Japanese agreement and take a different approach when drafting SO-
FAs with other nations.
E. Avoiding Criminal Jurisdiction on a Larger Scale: The
International Criminal Court
Current events further demonstrate deteriorating foreign rela-
tions as a result of the United States' absolute refusal to surrender to
another nation or entity's jurisdiction. Recently, the United States re-
fused to ratify the Rome Treaty that would create the world's first In-
ternational Criminal Court ("ICC"). The ICC is a transnational forum
to prosecute individuals, not governments, for the commission of
crimes that "shock the conscience of humankind," 169 such as "geno-
cide, war crimes, [and] crimes against humanity.' 170
Despite the fact that the ICC "will not supercede national legal
systems ... [but] will intercede only when national courts are unable
to investigate or prosecute serious crimes [,] "171 the United States con-
siders the ICC "fundamentally flawed because it puts American ser-
vicemen and women at ... risk of being tried (by) an entity that is
beyond America's reach, beyond America's laws, and could subject
Americans-civilian and military-to arbitrary standards of justice."1 72
Presently, seventy-five nations have ratified the Rome Treaty, 173 and
168. See Bugni, supra note 137, at 106.
169. John L. Washburn, Exempting the United States from Equal Justice Under Law, Car-
negie Council on Ethics & International Affairs, at http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/test/
lib _povwashburn.html (July 2, 2002) (last visited Sept. 29, 2002).
170. Bush Digs in Against War Crimes Court (July 2, 2002), at http://www.msnbc.com/
news/774480.asp (last visited July 2, 2002) (establishing that crimes against humanity in-
clude murder or torture, rape, and sexual slavery).
171. Id.
172. Id. White House spokesman, Ari Fleischer, stated that "[t]his is a very important
matter of principle about protecting Americans who uniquely serve around the globe in
peace-keeping efforts .... The world should make no mistake the United States will stand
strong and stand on principle to do what is right to protect our citizens." Id.
173. See Anthony Deutsch, International War Crimes Court Opens for Business, THE SACRA-
MENTO BEE, July 1, 2002, at http://www.sacbee.com/24hour/world/story/452408p-
36227x35c.html (last visited July 2, 2002).
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the United States is "the only democratic country in open opposition"
to the ICC.17 4 Alas, "[w]hen the United States voted in Rome against
the treaty. . . , it broke ranks with its closest allies."1 75 Other countries
protest the United States' "tendency to behave like a rogue super-
power, responsible to no one but ... [itself, and many had] hoped
that [the] September 11th [terrorist attacks] would [have] chang[ed]
the United States and prompt[ed] it to re-engage with the interna-
tional community." 176 Thus, similar to the friction caused by inequita-
ble SOFAs, "the most corrosive effect of the U.S. vote against the...
Treaty... [appears to be] the damage done to the moral dimension
of U.S. international leadership. '177
IV. Solution
The United States should heed lessons to be learned from the
fading United States-Japan partnership. Since World War II, Asia has
been a region of major interest to the United States. 178 The United
States has invested much time and energy by fighting two wars on the
continent and expending more than 100,000 lives in those endeav-
ors.179 Japan is currently the most powerful nation in that region. As
expected, the United States government maintains a keen interest in
Japan, and it is to its advantage to foster and maintain positive rela-
tions with this Asian powerhouse.
Due to the inordinate amount of economic and political power
that the United States currently possesses, it has been "unavoidably
thrust into a position of global leadership."1 8 0 It is essential that the
United States set an example and undertake a more egalitarian ap-
proach when it creates SOFAs in the future. Specifically, the United
States must take on an international morality. This involves realizing
and addressing the "extra-legal obligations . . . [that are] incumbent
174. Washburn, supra note 169.
175. The Case for U.S. Support, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, at http://
www.open.igc.org/khr/feature/50th/USPOS.htm (July 2, 2002) (last visited Sept. 29,
2002).
176. Ramesh Thakur, Diplomacy's Odd Couple, The U.S. and the U.N.; Peacekeeping, INT'L
HERALD TRIBUNE, July 26, 2002, at Opinion Section, 11.
177. Id.
178. See HARTMANN & WENDZEL, supra note 103, at 413.
179. See id.
180. DAVID LITTLE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY & MORAL RHETORIC THE EXAMPLE OF VI-
ETNAM 86 (1969).
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upon [a] ... state in respect.., to its international dealings."' 8 1 Draft-
ing a SOFA does not merely create a legally binding document, but
rather fosters a partnership, embracing another culture and sharing
human values.
A. Addressing the Historical Context of the Host Country
The first step in undertaking an international morality is to de-
velop a cultural sensitivity toward the host country by analyzing its his-
torical roots. For example, "war and conflict have been almost
constant phenomena in Asia."' 82 If the United States is to shape a
SOFA to accommodate the Asian culture, it must take into account
that "nearly all of Asia fell under foreign... domination in the... pre-
twentieth century imperialist expansion . . .[] [t] he colonization-
decolonization process left a permanent mark [, and] . . . Asians are
bound to be at least somewhat suspicious of the intentions of
foreigners ... ,"183
Analyzing the situation at hand, both Japan and the United States
would have benefited had the United States studied the history of the
sites of its bases prior to entering the agreement. For example, Oki-
nawa, where most Japan-based American troops are stationed, has an
exceptionally precarious past. This region of Japan is unique because
it has always been somewhat separate from mainland Japan. Annexed
to Japan in the 1870s, at the close of World War II it was the site of
one of the war's last major battles,18 4 which lasted three months and
claimed 234,183 Okinawan lives.' 8 5 Approximately one-third of the
Okinawan population was lost in that battle.18 6 At that point, the
United States took control over the land until 1972, when it reverted
back to Japan. 18 7
Understanding the Okinawan experience would help the United
States to understand why some Japanese citizens are so resentful of
their military presence, especially in light of the continuing crimes
perpetrated by United States servicepeople stationed in Okinawa.
Both Japanese and specifically the Okinawans deserve to have their
181. Geoffrey Stern, Morality and International Order, in THE BASES OF INTERNATIONAL
ORDER ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF C.A.W. MANNING 134 (Alan James ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1973).
182. HARTMANN & WENDZEL, supra note 103, at 414.
183. Id. at 415.
184. See Norman, supra note 8, at 723.
185. See Chen, supra note 4, at Al.
186. See id.
187. See Norman, supra note 8, at 723.
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cultural experiences factored into the United States-Japan SOFA.
Each SOFA should be specially tailored to encompass the specific cir-
cumstances at hand and to be sensitive to the concerns of those di-
rectly affected by the agreement.
B. Equal Bargaining Power
The second step in undertaking an international morality is to
ensure equal bargaining power within the SOFA, between the parties
to the agreement. Traditionally, bargaining power has been deter-
mined by each country's relative degree of sovereignty, measured ac-
cording to the country's general economic, political, and military
strength. However, the notion of sovereignty is changing in the mod-
ern era.188 Nations now possess varying degrees of military and eco-
nomic power and thus are no longer measured solely according to
their own strength, but also by the strength of their associations with
other countries.
Today's view is that a nation can remain sovereign and "volunta-
rily band together for common defense."18 9 This new vision communi-
cates equality among nations. One country may have a smaller
economy or army, but that country still holds a valuable asset-the
strength that it provides another country by acting as its ally. Unfortu-
nately, because the United States possesses such immense power on
every level, it tends to operate with an arrogance that undermines its
judgment in international relations. 190 This poses problems when
countries such as Japan gain increasing power and demand to be
treated more justly. 191 In order to establish and sustain positive work-
ing relations by means of a SOFA, the United States needs to make
the SOFA equally beneficial, giving each country an active voice in its
making and maintenance. This is especially important when the
United States establishes a military base, becoming a guest on another
country's land.
C. Updating SOFAs to Reflect the Current Situation
The third step in undertaking an international morality includes
continually modifying SOFAs to conform to changing circumstances
and to address the shifting needs of the parties to the agreement. De-
cades prior, the primary mission of the United States when entering
188. See Porrata-Doria, supra note 139, at 89-90.
189. Id. at 90.
190. See Little, supra note 180, at 9-10.
191. See HARTMANN & WENDZEL, supra note 103, at 418.
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SOFAs was to contain communism. 192 However, following the demise
of the communist threat, United States bases remained intact. Inevita-
bly the purpose of these bases changed and it has become imperative
that the agreements be modified to reflect these transformations. 93
Generally, "[w]ith receding external threats, the host nation per-
ceives less necessity for the stationing of foreign forces in its territory
and for the granting of special privileges to those forces."1 9 4 Internal
factors such as political opinion and internal pressure will have
greater weight in these situations.195 The United States should recog-
nize these changing attitudes and modify both the agreement and its
presence in the host nation to reflect current circumstances.
These modifications are extremely important for SOFAs initially
premised on war-time occupation that later lead to a continuing de-
fensive operation. As opposed to United States SOFAs instituted for
peace-keeping where consent is initially obtained from the host na-
tion, SOFAs created following conquest are established without the
host nation's consent. As in Japan, the United States often establishes
bases in conquered countries under the guise of "reconstruction." In
these situations, once the country has been "rebuilt" and security
threats have diminished, theoretically the United States should have
to then obtain consent to have any further presence in that host na-
tion. The United States is likely reluctant to do this because it may
anticipate that the host nation would call for SOFA revision and de-
mand increased bargaining power in the agreement.
D. Enforce Current Provisions and Amend Inequitable Jurisdiction
Provisions
The fourth step in undertaking an international morality requires
enforcing current SOFA provisions, and modifying imbalanced and
unfair jurisdictional provisions. For example, Article VII of the cur-
rent United States-Japan SOFA calls for the parties to assist each other
in the arrest, transfer of custody, and facilitation of communication
and investigation of the accused. 19 6 Statistics and continuous Japanese
complaints indicate that the United States is not living up to this term
192. See Hemmert, supra note 1, at 216.
193. See id. at 235.
194. John E. Parkerson,Jr., The Peacetime Use of Foreign Military Installations Under Modern
International Law, 141 MIL. L. REv. 232, 235 (1993).
195. See id.
196. See Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, supra note 102, at 11 U.S.T. at
1666.
(Vol. 37
Fall 2002]
of the agreement. Unfortunately, all too often "the law tends to be
what we say ... [and] not what we do."19 7 The United States needs to
make a "conscious commitment to the actual living out of peace-ori-
ented values" to which it claims to ascribe.19
Not only does the United States need to abide by current provi-
sions of the United States-Japan SOFA, it must also revise the sections
that are inherently biased and unfair. Specifically, the United States
should rework section 5 (c), the custody provision of Article VII, which
currently allows the United States to retain custody of the accused ser-
vice person until he or she is formally charged by Japanese authori-
ties.199 When a crime has been committed on Japanese soil, at the very
least, Japanese law enforcement should have access to the accused to
investigate the matter at hand. The United States should be willing to
work in conjunction with Japanese law enforcement to bring about
expedient and just resolution to crimes committed by United States
servicepersons.
On October 25, 1995, President Clinton declared that the United
States would agree to give "sympathetic consideration to requests [for early
custody of the accused] concerning rape and murder cases," 20 0 how-
ever sympathetic consideration is not enough. The terms of the agree-
ment should be changed to ensure United States compliance with the
agreement's provisions and further, that criminals are brought to jus-
tice. "[T]he interests of the parties to the . . .[SOFA], as well as the
national policies underlying the agreement, can only be served if the
obligation undertaken in the agreement to surrender a serviceman to
the host nation is recognized. . . .[Acting] contrarily[,] cast[s] in
doubt the entire. . . arrangement [of which the SOFA is only a
part]."2°1
The United States should also alter the nonreciprocal status of
the current United States-Japan SOFA to reciprocal, similar to the
NATO SOFA. This change would merely grant Japanese authorities
the same rights to exercise jurisdiction on American soil if they were
to station troops in the United States. 20 2 There seems to be no ra-
tional justification for why European nations under the NATO SOFA
197. Burns H. Heston, The Role of Law in Promoting Peace & Violence: A Matter of Defini-
tion, Social Values, and Individual Responsibility, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER & HUMAN DIGNITY
114, 122 (W. MichaelReisman & Burns H. Hestor eds., The Free Press 1976).
198. Id. at 26.
199. See Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, supra note 102, at 11 U.S.T. 1665.
200. Norman, supra note 8, at 724 (emphasis added).
201. Teagarden, supra note 47, at 33.
202. See Hemmert, supra note 1, at 226.
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are the only nations in the world bestowed this right, when Asian and
other countries are not.203
Lastly, when the United States rightfully attains jurisdiction over
one of its service persons, it should properly punish the wrongdoer.
The Uniform Military Code of Justice, serving as the current working
judicial authority, often only proscribes nonjudicial punishments or
court martials. 2 1°4 These types of "punishments" can be seen as a slap
on the wrist that fails to deter the problem, and instead exacerbates it.
The United States should modify the Uniform Military Code ofJustice
to at least mirror its domestic criminal justice system, where the pun-
ishment increases according to the severity of the crime.205 In line
with the theory underlying the proposed ICC-that unless the world
community is held accountable for the crimes it commits, those
crimes will continue to occur-United States servicepersons must also
be held accountable for the wrongs they commit, in order to halt the
cycle of violence.20 6
E. Morality
The fifth step in undertaking an international morality is to actu-
ally incorporate morality into our international negotiations. Because
of the United States' position of global leadership, its "standards of
conduct must, inevitably, have a great influence in setting the moral
tone of international relations .... 207 "Without doubt, influence in the
world depends on might and wealth. But it also depends on moral
stature and the power of principles. '20 8 In order to live up to and
maintain its dominant position, the United States must look at per-
sonal and national interests from the point of view of the welfare of all
humans.209 This involves embracing a wider system of values that tran-
203. See Norman, supra note 8, at 733.
204. See Caron, supra note 60, at 13-15.
205. See Caron, supra note 60, at 16 (noting that it is not uncommon for United States
service persons court-martialed in foreign countries to receive lesser sentences that those
that would have been imposed in United States' civilian courts).
206. See generally LAWYERs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE CASE FOR U.S. SUPPORT
(Sept. 24, 2002), available at http://www.open.igc.org/khr/feature/50th/USPOS.htm (last
visited Sept. 29, 2002). ("By helping to deter atrocities, the court will reduce the chances
that American troops will have to be deployed in response to future [international
crises] ").
207. LITTLE, supra note 180, at 86 (citing ROBERT F. OSGOOD, IDEALS AND SELF INTEREST
IN AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY 444, 450 (1953)).
208. LAwyERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 206.
209. See LITTLE, supra note 180, at 24.
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scends its national interests.210 Whether it be putting aside "un-
founded fears of phantom prosecutions" 21' and signing on to the
International Criminal Court, or on a more wide-spread level, weaken-
ing its jurisdictional stronghold when drafting SOFAs, the United
States must demonstrate a willingness to answer to others, rather than
only to the American public.
Obviously this is a lofty and optimistic proposal that may be ex-
tremely difficult to carry out. It is hard to imagine the United States
yielding some of its immense power because there is a "natural unwill-
ingness of people to abandon power . . . as a result of proposed
changes, even when it is argued that these changes will confer benefits
on members of the international system generally at a later stage. '212
But most foreign policy decisions do not require forfeiting national
interests entirely. Rather, they tend to involve more subtle questions
regarding the protection of treaty rights and the preservation of outly-
ing bases. 213 If the United States can make these decisions equitably
and with respect for the concerns of the host nation, it can set the
groundwork for more diplomatic foreign policy.
Conclusion
The Japanese-United States partnership is deteriorating. The
roots of this failure can be directly linked to crimes committed by
United States servicepeople in Japan. Realizing their unequal status
under the current Japanese-United States SOFA, some Japanese citi-
zens are demanding an immediate revision of that agreement. Until
now, the United States has mostly ignored these pleas and as a result,
a mutually beneficial international partnership is in jeopardy.
In this global era, a nation's strength is not only defined by its
economic and military power, but also by the partnerships it main-
tains. One way the United States can improve its foreign policy is to
learn from the Japanese experience and alter its approach to negotiat-
ing SOFAs with other foreign countries. The United States needs to
humble itself and take a more egalitarian approach when entering
into these agreements. If the United States can realize that more than
210. See id. at 19.
211. Press Release, William F. Schulz, The "Unsigning" of the International Criminal Court
Treaty (May 6, 2002), at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/usa05062002.htm (last
visited July 2, 2002).
212. F. S. Northedge, Order and Change in International Society, in THE BASES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ORDER 7 (Alan James ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1973).
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its own power and prestige is at stake when engaging in international
agreements, then it will be able to establish more positive and far-
reaching relations in the global marketplace.
Particularly, the United States must be willing to loosen its juris-
dictional grip, allow itself to be held accountable to others, and adopt
an international morality. This entails fashioning SOFAs that take into
account the host country's history and cultural background, that allot
equal bargaining power, that can adapt to the current social order,
that are fair as drafted and actually enforced, and lastly, that encom-
pass morality in general. Overall, this requires the United States to
value and respect all human needs, not only the needs of its citizens. If
the United States can learn from its mistakes and undertake these dif-
ficult objectives, it will strengthen its international presence and foster
more honorable foreign relations.
